Spy Agencies Disagree on Iran Nuke Capabilities

Joseph Fitsanakis

(Dr. Joseph Fitsanakis teaches politics and history at King College, USA. He is Senior Editor of intelNews.org.)

 

Copyright: www.rieas.gr

 

The vast majority of Western and Israeli defense and intelligence agencies agree that Iran’s ultimate aim is to fortify its military posture with nuclear weapons. Cross-agency –let along cross-national– consensus on matters of nuclear intelligence is rare, but there is nothing profound about this particular agreement. Only a cursory look on a world map is sufficient to confirm –even strategically justify, some would say– Iran’s nuclear intentions.

 

First, the country is dangerously close to several confirmed or aspiring nuclear powers, including Pakistan, India, Russia, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Turkey. Second, Iranian strategists are faced with the reality of Israel’s nuclear arsenal, now implicitly acknowledged even by the US Pentagon (01). Last, but not least, Iranians are faced with the military encirclement of their country by an energy-hungry America from the east (Afghanistan) and west (Iraq) (02). One can therefore sensibly deduce that Iranian military strategists would be foolish not to consider going nuclear. Indeed, considering the above realities, a hypothetical abandonment of Iran’s nuclear option would be interpreted by a host of domestic forces as a fundamental betrayal of the country’s national interests. This accounts for the broad tacit consensus in favor of nuclearization within Iranian society.

Putting aside, however, the broad concurrence of opinion about Iran’s long-term nuclear intentions, very little is clear about the immediate status of the country’s nuclear program. Since the very commencement of its nuclear effort, Iran has maintained that its goal is peaceful; namely to invest in nuclear energy so as to free up large quantities of oil for exports, which will, in turn, translate in a drastic increase in desperately needed income in foreign currency. It is important to stress that the consensus among America’s intelligence agencies agrees that this is in fact Iran’s immediate goal. This was pronounced in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a publicly available annual report cooperatively authored by the heads of all 16 US intelligence agencies. The 2007 report stated “with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program” (03).

 

Even before the recent disclosure by Iran –and not by US officials, as is often misstated (04) — of a previously secret uranium-enriching facility near the city of Qum, several US commentators, mostly of the conservative persuasion, severely criticized the 2007 NIE (05). They have been doing so even more aggressively since the exposure of the Qum plant. In one characteristic example, a New York Post columnist went so far as to dismiss the 2007 NIE as a “fraud” (06).

 

But the reality is that the existence of Iran’s second uranium enrichment plant –of which, incidentally, Western and Israeli intelligence agencies have been aware for years (07) — does not necessarily contest the findings of the 2007 NIE. As Federation of American Scientists researcher Ivanka Barzashka correctly points out in a well-researched article (08) on the Federation’s website, “we cannot definitively conclude that the [Qum] enrichment plant has a military function”. Additionally, Iran’s offer to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency inspection standards, should not be lightly dismissed by proponent’s of the existence of Iran’s nuclear armament program (09).

 

In fact, the 2007 NIE consensus among US intelligence agencies, namely that Iran’s nuclear armament program has been essentially halted, remains unchanged even after the revelation of the Qum plant, for the simple reason that the authors of the 2007 NIE report were aware of the plant’s existence at the time of writing. Consequently, US intelligence agencies are today “[standing] firm in their conclusion that while Iran may ultimately want a bomb, the country halted work on weapons design in 2003 and probably has not restarted that effort” (10).

 

Interestingly, this conclusion is not shared by other Western and Israeli intelligence agencies, most of which firmly believe that Iran’s nuclear armament program is active and guides the country’s nuclearization efforts. Along with the Israelis, who have been repeatedly restrained by Washington from launching direct military strikes against Tehran (11), French, German (12) and British (13) intelligence sources believe Iran is actively and aggressively pursuing the bomb.

 

Ironically, the setting of this intelligence debate is a mirror image of the discussion about Iraq’s purported “weapons of mass destruction”, which took place in early 2003. At that time, the Americans were the ones eager to enter into war, based on unconvincing suspicions that caused skepticism in London, Frankfurt and Paris. It is very likely that US intelligence agencies are now hesitant to draw firm conclusions about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, precisely because of their unfortunate experience in the case of Iraq. Back then, their “false intelligence” (14)  (George W. Bush) helped plunge the US into an unpopular, bloody war, which destabilized Iraq, further diminished America’s standing in the Arab world, and brought the US economy into the brink of collapse.

 

Now, six years later, Washington is right to be hesitant about opening yet another front in the so-called “war on terrorism”. US strategy planners should offer their country’s intelligence agencies the opportunity to rectify their shoddy performance in 2003, before deciding to delve into yet another dangerous and unpredictable war in the volatile Middle East.

 

REFERENCES CITED

 

01 I. ALLEN “US Pentagon report acknowledges Israel has the bomb” intelNews [20mar2009]

02 In fact, it can be reasonably argued that the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the years immediately after 9/11 had an accelerating effect on nuclear proliferation among non-nuclear powers, such as North Korea, Syria and, of course, Iran, all of whom had reason to believe they were next on the list of invasions.

03 US National Intelligence Council National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, [jul2007]

04 J. FITSANAKIS “How did Iran know US planned to reveal nuclear facility?” intelNews [28sep2009]

05 I. ALLEN “Article questions 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran” intelNews [10dec2009]

06 R. LOWRY “Iran: The great US intelligence fraud” The New York Post [29sep2009]

07 M. HOSENBALL “More Details on What the US Knows About Iran’s Secret Nuclear Site” Newsweek [25sep2009]

08 I. BARZASHKA “The Qom Uranium Enrichment Facility: What and How Do We Know” Federation of American Scientists [29sep2009]

09 ANON. “US Welcomes Iran Inspection Offer” BBC [26sep2009]

10 W.J. BROAD and M. MAZZETTI “Intelligence dispute brews over state of Iran’s nuclear plans” The New York Times [29sep2009]

11 D.E. SANGER “US Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site” The New York Times [10jan2009]

12 ANON. “Iran could have the bomb in six months, says German intelligence” intelNews [15jul2009]

13 ANON. “British intelligence believes Iran has resumed work on nuclear warhead” The Daily Telegraph [30sep2009]

14 ANON. “Bush: My biggest regret is false intelligence on Iraq WMDs” Reuters

Terrorist “Near Capable” in Cyber War

Terrorists nearing ability to launch big cyberattacks against U.S.

By Jill R. Aitoro 10/02/2009

The biggest threat to U.S. computer networks is terrorist organizations that will purchase software code from cybercriminals to penetrate sensitive systems, a possibility that could be just a few years away, information security and former intelligence officials said on Friday. Although enemy states often are blamed for cyberattacks against the United States, it is not common because political and financial repercussions dissuade most countries from launching a widespread effort, James Woolsey, a former CIA director, said during a panel discussion at the International Spy Museum. The talk was part of the launch of a new gallery on cyber threats. “We don’t have the [degree] of strife [with] those that have these capabilities — such as China and Russia,” that would cause them to attack the United States, Woolsey said. “The ultimate problem we face is the possibility that we will have an enemy whose objective is total destruction.” Power plants are a prime target, he said, with the goal being to take down the electric grid. “Would anyone want to do that?” Woolsy asked. “Yes. We saw their faces on 9/11.” Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist organizations are honest about what motivates them, he said. “They believe God wants to destroy the U.S.,” Woolsey added. “That’s a different kind of enemy.” While most nation states have the capability to launch a widespread cyberattack, but choose not to, terrorist organizations have not yet developed the necessary computer programming skills to do significant damage, according to Mike McConnell, former director of National Intelligence. “When terrorist groups have the sophistication, they’ll use it,” he said. That could happen within the next few years as cybercriminals peddle through the black market the software programs needed to launch a debilitating cyberattack, said James Lewis, director of the technology and public policy program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “When does stuff get good enough for al Qaeda to go buy it? That will happen in the next few years,” he said. McConnell also noted the possibility that enemy nation states will use a terrorist organization as a proxy, providing the technology but denying involvement. Among the most effective strategies to combat cybercrime and terrorism is international engagement to support global criminal investigation and legal action against those tied to cyberwarfare activities, Lewis said. “We agreed to not sell nuclear weapons to terrorists and that’s worked out pretty well,” he said. “Now we need agreement among nations to not supply terrorists with these capabilities and to support better cybercrime laws” to pursue those that support attacks.

Singapore-US: Airforce Interoperability Ties

F-16 Pilot Training and Logistics Support For Singapore Air Force News — By US Defense Security Cooperation Agency on September 16, 2009 at 5:03 am (No Ratings Yet) Loading …

WASHINGTON: Today the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Singapore the continuation of the Continental United States (CONUS) pilot proficiency training program for PEACE CARVIN II and munitions, services and support for F-16C/D aircraft. The estimated cost is $250 million.

The Government of Singapore has requested a possible sale for the continuation of the Continental United States (CONUS) pilot proficiency training program for PEACE CARVIN II and munitions, services and support for F-16C/D aircraft which include: 35,000 20mm cartridges, aircraft modification kits, maintenance, participation in joint training exercises, fuel and fueling services, supply support, flight training, spare and repair parts, support equipment, program support, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistical and program support.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the U.S. by helping to improve the security of a critical regional partner which has been, and continues to be, an important force for economic progress in Southeast Asia. This proposed sale will help augment the Republic of Singapore’s self-defense capability and will ensure interoperability with U.S. forces for coalition operations. Singapore is a firm supporter of U.S. overseas contingency operations. Singapore needs these munitions, services and equipment to continue a long-term pilot proficiency-training program at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. This program will enable Singapore to develop mission-ready and experienced pilots through its CONUS training program to support Singapore’s current and future F-16 aircraft inventory. The long-term pilot training program in CONUS continues a professional interaction and enhances operational interoperability with U.S. forces. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. There is no prime contractor involved in this program. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Singapore. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. This notice of a potential sale is required by law and does not mean the sale has been concluded.

Asia Spending Massively on Navy

Singapore: Asian states led by China, Japan and South Korea are expected to spend some 60 billion dollars to beef up their navies in the next five years, an industry analyst said Monday.

 

That is bigger than what NATO countries — excluding the United States — are forecast to spend for new naval construction in the same period, said Bob Nugent, vice president of US-based naval consultancy AMI International.

 

The world’s biggest spender will remain the United States at a little above 60 billion dollars between now and 2014, Nugent said here on the eve of IMDEX Asia 2009, Asia’s top maritime defence show.

 

Non-NATO European countries led by Russia are forecast to spend 11 billion dollars on new naval capabilities in the next five years, he added.

 

Nugent said that for Asia, the most popular buys are submarines, frigates and aviation-capable amphibious ships as governments build “third generation” navies with underwater, surface and aerial capabilities.

 

Asian navies are also moving away from their main role of patrolling local waters to having the capability to operate in international waters, he added.

 

“Defence spending in Asia has proven stable over the last year and is expected to remain so. Looking at the global market, we’ve not seen the same cutbacks that are unfolding in Europe,” Nugent said.

 

“In our view, this reflects greater macroeconomic stability and relatively less exposure to systemic and credit risk in most Asian economies as well as a recognition of how vital effective sea power is to national security and prosperity.”

 

China, Japan and South Korea will lead the region in naval spending, but India is also ramping up investments to modernise its navy, he said.

 

Australia and Singapore have substantial naval programmes planned, while Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand are expected to sustain investments in their navies in the next five years.

 

Apart from planning for conventional and non-conventional security threats, Asian navies are also building their capability to protect offshore oil rigs and platforms as the search for more energy sources expands, he said.

 

Delegates from 36 countries, including some defence and navy chiefs, will attend the conference and exhibition, while 20 warships from 14 nations will dock here for the duration.

Vietnam Gets Advance Russian Fighters

Russia to deliver Su-30MK2 fighters to Vietnam

Air Force News — By RIA Novosti on August 24, 2009 at 6:21 am

 

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ZHUKOVSKY: Russia will fulfill a contract on the delivery of eight Su-30MK2 fighters to Vietnam in 2010, state arms exporter Rosoboronexport said on Wednesday.

 

Russia and Vietnam signed a of $500 million agreement on the sale of eight Su-30MK2 fighters in January 2009.

 

“The contract was signed in January, and we will fulfill it in 2009-2010,” Alexander Mikheyev, deputy general director of Rosoboronexport said at the MAKS-2009 air show near Moscow.

 

Mikheyev said Vietnam had already made several advanced payments under the contract and the deliveries would be made in two batches of four aircraft each.

 

Su-30MK2 is an advanced two-seat version of the Su-27 Flanker multirole fighter with upgraded electronics and capability to launch anti-ship missiles.

 

Russia’s Federal Service for Military Cooperation said in June that Vietnam had expressed interest in buying additional Su-30MK2 fighters and talks on a new contract could start in the near future.

 

Military aircraft continue to dominate Russia’s arms exports, and are expected to total about $2.6 billion in 2009 sales.

Intellipedia Hot

For Intelligence Officers, A Wiki Way to Connect Dots

 

By Steve Vogel

Washington Post Staff Writer

Thursday, August 27, 2009

 

 

 

Intellipedia, the intelligence community’s version of Wikipedia, hummed in the aftermath of the Iranian presidential election in June, with personnel at myriad government agencies updating a page dedicated to tracking the disputed results.

 

Similarly, a page established in November immediately after the terrorist attack in Mumbai provided intelligence analysts with a better understandinsg of the scope of the incident, as well as a forum to speculate on possible perpetrators.

 

“There were a number of things posted that were ahead of what was being reported in the press,” said Sean Dennehy, a CIA officer who helped establish the site.

 

Intellipedia is a collaborative online intelligence repository, and it runs counter to traditional reluctance in the intelligence community to the sharing of classified information. Indeed, it still meets with formidable resistance from many quarters of the 16 agencies that have access to the system.

 

But the site, which is available only to users with proper government clearance, has grown markedly since its formal launch in 2006 and now averages more than 15,000 edits per day. It’s home to 900,000 pages and 100,000 user accounts.

 

“About everything that happens of significance, there’s an Intellipedia page on,” Dennehy said.

 

Intellipedia sprung from a 2004 paper by CIA employee Calvin Andrus titled “The Wiki and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community.”

 

Dennehy listened to a presentation by Andrus and recalled the skepticism among colleagues about adapting Wikipedia to the intelligence community. He shared their skepticism. “But something he said interested me enough to look into it further,” Dennehy said.

 

Context was also a factor. After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, intelligence agencies had come under intense criticism for failing to pull together disparate strands of information pointing to the possibility of a major incident.

 

“We were all doing it in stovepipes,” Dennehy said.

 

Dennehy described 9/11 not so much as a catalyst but as a selling point to explain how Intellipedia could help collate information. “Cal used 9/11 as a backdrop,” said Dennehy. “It was really more about what was happening on the Web.”

 

In 2005, Dennehy was given the job of leading the effort and persuading the intelligence community to use it, a task likened to “promoting vegetarianism in Texas” by the Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit group devoted to improving the federal government.

 

Cultural resistance to Intellipedia includes concerns that foreign intelligence agents could hack into the system. Many intelligence officers, particularly of the older generation, simply do not trust it.

 

“There isn’t any one agency that is more or less prone to use it. It’s really a product of individuals,” said Don Burke, a fellow CIA officer who helps promote the Intellipedia initiative.

 

Burke said Intellipedia remains largely the province of early adopters. While some pages are robust and balanced, he added, “there are other pages that leave a lot to be desired, to put it bluntly.”

 

A CIA officer, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the classified nature of his work, said Intellipedia “makes it very real-time. You can move down the road fast and focus on catching bad guys. We can really bring our expertise right to the war without leaving our desks.”

 

Intellipedia, which uses the same software as Wikipedia, operates on three levels: an unclassified version, a secret version and a top-secret version. Beyond that, there are “bread crumbs” that could lead a user with proper clearance to additional information offline, Burke said.

 

Burke said that beyond major incidents such as the Mumbai attack, the biggest advantage is in connecting users seeking information on small, obscure subjects, something he described as “a thousand small wins a day.”

 

Burke and Dennehy have been chosen as finalists for the 2009 Service to America Medals, sponsored by the Partnership for Public Service. The recipients of the medals, which are awarded in eight areas of public service, will be announced next month.

 

Max Stier, president and chief executive of the Partnership for Public Service, described Intellipedia as an important post-Sept. 11 reform, but one that did not involve a major bureaucratic shake-up, as with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

 

“It’s the kind of work we need to see more out of government,” Stier said. “They’re connecting the dots without rearranging the deck chairs.”

 

 

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US Agents Recruit Drug Lords

 

Mayhem Crosses the Border With Informers

U.S. Agents Recruiting Mexican Drug Figures

 

By William Booth

Washington Post Foreign Service

Thursday, August 27, 2009

 

 

 

EL PASO — José Daniel González was living the sweet life in America. He bought the $365,000 two-story Mediterranean with the tile roof and swimming pool. He started a trucking company, was raising a family. But on a Friday night in May, he was executed in his front yard — eight shots, tight pattern, close range.

 

According to police detectives, González knew the man who ordered his killing. He also knew the man who stood on his lawn and watched him die. These things are often personal, especially among high-level drug traffickers.

 

A gangland-style slaying is no big news across the river in Ciudad Juarez, the bloodiest city in Mexico, where more than 1,300 people have been killed this year and only a handful of cases have been solved, despite the presence of 10,000 soldiers and federal police officers as part of President Felipe Calderón’s war on drug cartels.

 

But in El Paso, where local leaders boast how safe their city is and the 12 homicides this year have almost all been solved, the González slaying was as disturbing as it was sensational. For people here, the blood splashed on a pretty American street was a jarring sign that Mexico’s drug violence is spilling across the border into U.S. suburbia.

 

Most unsettling for many, especially El Paso police officials, was that both González and the man accused of ordering his killing turned out to be ranking drug traffickers from the notorious Juarez cartel, as well as informers for the U.S. government.

 

“So this is how these people end up in our country,” said El Paso police Lt. Alfred Lowe, the lead homicide detective and a 29-year veteran whose team made the arrests in the González case. “We bring them here.”

 

As a spectacular wave of drug violence washes over Mexico, the Obama administration, the U.S. Congress and leaders in the Southwest states are spending billions of dollars and massing thousands of agents to keep the chaos from crossing the border. But in order to fight the drug traffickers, federal anti-narcotics agents have brought Mexican cartel members north of the border, to use them to gather intelligence and build cases.

 

That has also led to friction between U.S. law enforcement agencies. El Paso Police Chief Greg Allen, who lives close to the González home and heard the shots the night of the slaying, said he has complained to federal counterparts about a lack of cooperation and information sharing. Allen told reporters that he raised those complaints in meetings with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, known as ICE, which, according to police and charging documents, arranged for González’s visa so he could live in the United States.

 

Lowe said ICE agents were uncooperative during the investigation, misleading El Paso officers by failing to provide accurate names, photographs of suspects and timely intelligence that might have helped solve the homicide more quickly.

 

“We’ve never worked well with ICE,” Lowe said.

 

ICE officials declined to comment on the specifics of the González case or the conduct and cooperation of their agents. “As a matter of policy, we don’t confirm or deny confidential sources or sources of information,” said Richard Rocha, spokesman for ICE in Washington. “All allegations of misconduct are taken seriously and, if reported, will be fully reviewed.”

 

As the investigation into the González killing progressed this summer, police said they were further surprised to learn that the man charged with orchestrating the slaying was a fellow drug cartel member, a specialist in assassination — and a federal informer for ICE living in El Paso.

 

Rubén Rodríguez Dorado, a Mexican citizen, was detained this month and charged with murder in the González case. Before he was a suspect, police detectives said, they were introduced to Rodríguez by ICE agents, who presented him as an informer who might be able to help on the case.

 

When he met with El Paso police, who said they were not given his name, Rodríguez bragged that he was “the main man in El Paso” for the Juarez cartel. Detectives said they later learned that his specialty was arranging hits for hire. “He told us that he was high in the food chain and that he’d ask around and see what he could find and that he would let us know. Of course, he didn’t let us know anything,” Lowe said.

 

El Paso police arrested three American teenagers they said Rodríguez recruited to his crew: U.S. Army Pfc. Michael Jackson Apodaca, 18, who allegedly pulled the trigger; Chris Duran, 17, who drove the getaway car, according to the court papers; and a 16-year-old who police said did surveillance for the gang. Apodaca and Duran were charged as adults with murder. The name of the youngest teenager is being withheld.

 

Rodríguez’s attorney did not respond to telephone messages. Attorneys for the teenagers could not be located.

 

Lowe said that during the investigation, ICE agents introduced local police to other federal informers. One man was a cartel assassin. “His role was very brutal in Juarez. But here he is, just another cooperating witness, and we thought, if this guy is living here, how many more of them are there? This man is a known threat,” Lowe said. “We should be informed, not only for our safety but the safety of the community.”

 

El Paso police said they have evidence that González continued to work with the cartel while he was a federal informer in El Paso. While Rodríguez was cooperating with federal agents, he was arrested and charged in May with trying to steal an 18-wheeler filled with flat-screen televisions.

 

Law enforcement officials said El Paso is home to many cartel members and their families.

 

“Without a doubt, there are a lot of cartel members among us,” said Robert Almonte, executive director of the Texas Narcotic Officers Association and a retired deputy chief of the El Paso police. “They’ve been here for a long time. They come for the same reasons as you or me. It’s safer here. And if they have wives and kids, this is the place to be.”

 

Joseph M. Arabit, special agent in charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s office here, said that El Paso serves as an important staging point for Mexican drug trafficking but that violence is rare north of the border because cartel members “don’t want to face justice in the United States.”

 

Ranchos del Sol, the east-side El Paso neighborhood where the cartel hit occurred, is invitingly neat. On each block are new stucco homes painted in sand and sunset colors inspired by the desert. From the top of Bob Hope Drive, Ciudad Juarez can be seen in the hazy distance.

 

A number of residents in the neighborhood declined to give their names for publication, saying they were nervous about becoming targets.

 

A grandmother inspected plants outside her daughter’s home after picking up the mail. “I’m afraid that other people will be executed Juarez-style here in El Paso,” she said.

 

Three blocks away, Veronica Ortiz was getting ready to go on a drive with her husband and small children. “It doesn’t really affect us,” she said about the killing on Pony Trail Place. “I don’t think they go against innocent people.”

 

Another neighbor, a father of two, said he rode his bike past the cul-de-sac the night of the hit, moments before police arrived. “I would be outraged to know if the federal government owned that house and put a snitch in my neighborhood,” he said.

 

“We live in a city of don’t ask, don’t tell,” said Tony Payan, a professor at the University of Texas at El Paso who studies the drug trade. “The city is filled with stash houses, money laundering, shipments. Trucks come. Trucks go. Garage doors open and close. But the perception and reality of safety must be maintained at all costs. Leaders are obsessed with our ranking as the second or third safest city in America.”

 

Before González was shot dead in front of his house, he knew that he was in danger, police said. In May 2008, a leader of the Juarez cartel was arrested in Mexico. El Paso detectives said they read news accounts reporting that the tip had come from González. That kind of public disclosure is a potential death sentence in Juarez.

 

El Paso police said that González fled north sometime in 2008 and that ICE agents knew he was in trouble with the cartel.

 

According to police investigators, shortly before his death, González told his wife that if she ever heard from a man called El Dorado — Rodríguez’s street name — to warn him immediately, and that if anything happened to him, she was to call a telephone number he gave her. Police said the number was for his handler at ICE.

 

 

 

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CSIS: Obama and East Asia Strategy

Executive Summary
by Gerald Curtis
The Obama administration’s foreign policy in East Asia has been characterized more by continuity than by change, building on policies of previous administrations that have served U.S. interests well. But there is a danger that, forced by events to focus attention on the world’s hot spots, continuity will shade into complacency, leaving the administration to constantly try to catch up with developments in an East Asia that is rapidly changing.
Managing trilateral relations among the U.S., China, and Japan requires a multi-level approach. Each of these countries is in a transformative period that is changing the dynamics of their interaction. Bilateral relationships will remain central. It is unrealistic and unwise, however, to think of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship as comprising a G-2 for dealing with regional and global issues. The notion of a G-2 grossly exaggerates China’s strengths. It is not in U.S. interests to encourage China to believe that it has more power to influence global affairs than it actually possesses. Being the largest overseas purchaser of U.S. Treasury notes gives China considerable leverage in relations with the U.S. But one should not underestimate the mutual hostage quality that results from China being the largest holder of U.S. bonds, which produces a kind of economic Mutually Assured Destruction.
There is a role for ad hoc trilateral consultations with China and Japan but little to be gained from institutionalizing a consultative mechanism which would leave the South Koreans anxious about being left out, tempt China and Japan each to try to draw the U.S. to its side on controversial Sino-Japanese issues, and remove ASEAN as a useful neutral platform upon which these great powers can interact. As for institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks format, the reality is that these talks have failed to bring about the denuclearization of North Korea and it is not apparent why they would be useful to deal with issues not related to North Korea; it is not clear what such a “talk shop” would talk about. East Asia does not need a new security architecture. It needs an attentive U.S. government that engages with countries in the region flexibly and with imagination.
China’s need for a stable international environment within which it can pursue its economic development goals has made its foreign policy eminently pragmatic, as can be seen in recent policies toward Taiwan and Japan. But many things can upset this state of affairs. U.S. media criticism about China’s violations of human rights, the inherent fragility of an authoritarian political system lacking in sources of legitimacy other than its ability to produce rapid economic growth, a reversal of positive trends in cross-Strait relations, a sharp divide between the U.S. and China in views about how to respond to North Korea’s nuclear quest, and the possibility of growing protectionist pressures in the U.S. offer no room for complacency about future Sino-U.S. relations.
There does appear to be a considerable degree of complacency in the Obama administration about Japan and a tendency to underestimate Japan’s strengths and the potential for significant change in its foreign policy. Japan is going through an important political transition. It is not only that the DPJ is likely to form the next government. There is also a generational change underway that is going to bring to the fore politicians who do not view the
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U.S. through quite the same kind of “special relationship” lens that characterizes older political leaders. The U.S. needs to embark on a strategic dialogue with Japan that amounts to more than a dialogue about how Japan can do more to help achieve U.S. policy goals. But to do so requires that Japan be prepared to put forth its own ideas about how to enhance U.S.-Japan cooperation.
In the likely event that the DPJ comes to power, both Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and President Obama should be guided by an approach that is captured by one word: wait. Hatoyama should wait to go to Washington until he is prepared to offer specific proposals for how the U.S. and Japan can cooperate in dealing with important regional and global issues. Obama should wait until the Japanese government’s new leaders have had a chance to absorb the reality that some of the foreign policies they need to pursue are necessarily different from what they said they would do when they were in opposition. Already, as the prospect of a DPJ victory has grown, so too has the party’s efforts to make more conditional some campaign promises made only weeks earlier. If either side moves too precipitously, the result will be unnecessary and harmful confrontation.
But the Obama administration also needs to recognize that continuity in relations with Japan is not enough. The year 2010 is the 50th anniversary of the signing of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. This should be taken as an occasion not only to celebrate a remarkably deep and mutually beneficial alliance but to initiate a dialogue that would seek to bring that alliance more into sync with the needs of the first half of the 21st century rather than the second half of the last one.
The urgent tends to drive important but less urgent foreign policy issues to the bottom of the president’s inbox. A concerted effort is needed to insure that does not become the case with U.S. policy toward East Asia. This region is far too important to U.S. national interests to be treated with a kind of benign neglect; there is no room for complacency.
President Obama has the opportunity to build a strong relationship with the countries of East Asia on the foundation that his predecessors have left for him. But build he must. A comprehensive and constructive East Asian policy requires presidential leadership. It is only that leadership that will make continuity work.
Obama and East Asia: No Room for Complacency
By Gerald Curtis
Plus ca change….
President Barak Obama was elected on a platform of change, and in foreign relations as well on domestic issues change is mostly what his administration has been about. One important foreign policy exception, however, is policy toward East Asia. There the keyword is continuity, something that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton underscored in her February 2009 trip to the region.
She headed first to Tokyo, making the point in doing so that the Obama administration puts as much emphasis on the importance of its relationship with Japan as the cornerstone of U.S. policy in East Asia as did President Bush. In Seoul, she reaffirmed America’s commitment to its alliance with South Korea. In China she stressed the importance of cooperating to deal with the global economic crisis and said publicly that U.S. concerns about human rights would not be allowed to get in the way of dealing with more pressing political and economic matters. By visiting Indonesia, she signaled that the Obama administration would give more attention to Southeast Asia than did the Bush administration, and she followed through on that commitment in July when she signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. But she has not suggested that there would be substantial changes in the substance of U.S. policy toward the region.
Continuity in Obama’s East Asia policy is not just continuity with the Bush administration; it reaches back further into the postwar period. Ever since Richard Nixon opened the door to normal relations with the People’s Republic of China, every succeeding administration, some only after initially promising to reverse the China policy of the outgoing government, has embraced the view that it is in the U.S. national interest to deepen economic ties with China and encourage it to become fully enmeshed in the international system while at the same time hedging against the possibility that China will use its growing power in ways inimical to American interests. That is the policy line adopted by the Obama administration as well.
From Nixon to Obama, every U.S. president has called for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue and has sought to dissuade Taiwan’s leaders from raising tensions with the mainland with calls for Taiwan’s independence. President Bush made no secret of his dislike for Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, whom he regarded as a troublemaker whose actions threatened to upset U.S.-PRC relations. He welcomed the election of the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou and the improvement in cross-Straits relations that followed it. This improvement in China-Taiwan relations brought forth an equally positive response from President Obama.
A similar picture of continuity applies to U.S. relations with Japan. America’s alliance with Japan, which was forged in the early years of the Cold War, became the anchor for U.S. policy in East Asia. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1
development of positive U.S.-China relations, and persisting Japanese economic difficulties, the U.S.-Japan alliance remains essential to U.S. strategy in the region.
Basic continuity in U.S. East Asia policy should come as no surprise. National interests do not change with a change of government in Washington, and the East Asian policies that have evolved over several administrations have served those interests well. China, Japan, South Korea, and the countries in ASEAN have welcomed the Obama administration’s commitment to build its East Asian policies on the foundation laid by previous administrations.
But continuity implies progression and adaptation to changed circumstances; it does not mean simply carrying on the policies and the practices of the previous administration. President Obama confronts a very different challenge in East Asia than in the Middle East and South Asia, where a sharp break from the failed policies of the Bush administration is imperative. In East Asia, the challenges are in some ways more subtle and the policy adjustments required are complex. It is important not to let continuity become synonymous with complacency, especially in East Asia, a region where:
–China is emerging as a great power in all dimensions: economic, political, and military. It is already a major economic force in the world and with its military budget experiencing double-digit growth year after year, it is rapidly becoming a major regional military power as well. It has the largest army in the world, a nascent blue-water navy, nuclear weapons, and a growing capability to engage in cyber- and space warfare.
–Japan remains the largest economy in the world second only to the United States, and in terms of per capita income and living standards will remain one of the world’s most prosperous nations for many years to come. It has the economic and technological resources to play a very different role in the world if it musters the political will to do so.
–intra-regional trade and investment in East Asia are increasing rapidly. As Asian countries become more prosperous and as their middle class grows, the final destination of many of their exports will be in Asia itself. The East Asian region is experiencing growing economic regionalization and that is spurring the growth of significant regional political institutions.
Compelled by events to focus attention on other areas of the world, President Obama and Secretary Clinton might find themselves treating East Asia with a kind of benign neglect, camouflaged with ritualistic rhetorical affirmation of East Asia’s importance to the United States. Inattention and complacency, however, would leave the administration in a position of constantly having to catch up with developments in East Asia rather than do what it should do, which is to design a strategy that can help shape those developments.

CSIS: “The Coming 7 Revolutions”

Leadership is compressed. Greater connectivity across the world means broader perspectives are more important than ever before, but leaders—no matter what their sector—have far fewer opportunities to think beyond their short term priorities and immediate responsibilities. Instant information flows are bringing planning horizons closer and closer to the present; pressures from multiple stakeholders are eroding prospects for consensus. It is increasingly difficult for leaders to act in the short term in ways that will yield long-term results.

SEVEN REVOLUTIONS is a project led by the Global Strategy Institute at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to identify and analyze the key policy challenges that policymakers, business figures, and other leaders will face out to the year 2025. It is an effort to promote strategic thinking on the long-term trends that too few leaders take the time to consider.

In exploring the world of 2025, we have identified seven areas of change we expect to be most “revolutionary”:

1. Population
2. Resource management and environmental stewardship
3. Technological innovation and diffusion
4. The development and dissemination of information and knowledge
5. Economic integration
6. The nature and mode of conflict
7. The challenge of governance

Each of these seven forces embodies both opportunity and risk in the years ahead. Together, they will transform the way we live and interact with one another. That is why we call them the “Seven Revolutions.”

The key points of this research have been captured in an exciting, fast-paced, multimedia presentation that has been taken around the world. Erik Peterson, the project’s founder and director, has presented to every sector—from governments to private corporations to academia to nongovernmental organizations—and in every setting—from local boardrooms to huge auditoriums overseas. SEVEN REVOLUTIONS is constantly updated to reflect the latest data analysis and available technologies. It is an effective tool for pushing audiences to think outside of their areas of expertise and beyond their familiar planning parameters.

SEVEN REVOLUTIONS continues to be the focal point of a running debate at CSIS and other organizations on the most important forces shaping the world and the policy challenges they engender. It is a challenge to leaders—a challenge to think seriously about events that are over the horizon and a challenge to formulate and carry out policies in the near term to effect longer-range benefits. For more information on the presentation, please click here or contact Owen Sanderson at OSanderson@csis.org or (202) 775-3232.

Cuban Depression: The Price of Revolution

Six months after Fidel Castro’s exit, Lygia Navarro explores the hidden epidemic of depression in Cuba. With the wait for social and economic transformation dragging on, many Cubans find escape from the difficulty of day-to-day life in black-market sleeping pills.
Although Cuba’s medical system is lauded internationally, the government does not track rates of depression or of use of the nation’s most popular sedative, which is only available on the black market. In talking about the stigma of mental illness, psychiatrists say that depression due to the crippled economy is so common that it’s not considered a serious problem, yet Cuba has the highest suicide rate in Latin America. And even government pharmacists sell drugs on the black market in order to supplement their own meager salaries.

Navarro tells the stories of two depressed Cubans frustrated by the lack of change on the island, and of Cuba’s own contradictory relationship to mental illness.